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Introduction
Lindsay King*

Professor John A. Robertson's new book, Childrenof Choice: Freedom
and the New Reproductive Technologies,' presents a framework for
evaluating the controversies engendered by reproductive technologies and the
reproductive revolution. This framework centers on procreative liberty as
a value by which to judge reproductive techniques. According to Robertson,
procreative liberty, defined as the freedom to control one's own reproductive
capacity m deciding whether or not to procreate, is a basic right that should
receive presumptive priority in all challenges against its exercise. Because
reproductive experiences contribute substantially to a person's sense of
individual dignity and identity, reproductive freedom should triumph in all
instances in which opponents of reproductive freedom cannot establish that
substantial harms to third parties would result from its exercise.
Professor Robertson provides a two-step approach by which to assess
all reproductive technologies. First, the technique must promote a
distinctively procreative interest worthy of protection. Second, the harm
threatened to others from use of the tedhmque must be substantial to justify
overriding the identified procreative interest. The difficulty in evaluation
stems from differences of opinion concerning what qualifies as a sufficiently
substantial harm to defeat a reproductive liberty interest.
Professor Robertson evaluates four general categories of reproductive
technology under this procreative liberty analysis. He explores technologies
used to avoid reproduction, to assist reproduction, to control offspring
characteristics and quality, and to make nonreproductive use of reproductive
capacity Robertson identifies the degree of procreative interest that attaches
to each technique and the countervailing interests that opponents identify as
sufficiently worthy of protection to infringe upon the procreative interest.
Such countervailing interests include fears associated with interfering in
natural processes, the potential of diminishing respect for human life
generally, and possible adverse effects on the welfare of offspring resulting
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from unrealistic parental expectations and the undermining of traditional
notions of the family unit. The objectification of women and issues of cost,
access, and consumer protection as a result of these technologies also present
issues of concern.
Taking all of these considerations into account, Professor Robertson
concludes that in most cases in which procreative interests are present, the
countervailing considerations do not constitute substantial interests of the
kind necessary to override the procreative interests involved. Rather, he
says that the reservations voiced represent merely speculative and symbolic
concerns that offend personal notions of morality Robertson believes that
a majority of, although not all, reproductive technologies invoke core
procreative interests that competing concerns cannot defeat.
Professor Robertson suggests that his model is only one of many useful
perspectives from which to evaluate reproductive technologies, and he
invites evaluation by other perspectives in order to gain a fuller understanding of the issues and controversies surrounding the new reproductive
techniques that characterize the reproductive revolution. In the Symposium
section of tis issue, Professor Ann MacLean Massie, Professor Gilbert
Meilaender, Professor Laura M. Purdy, and Howard W Jones, M.D.,
discuss Robertson's model from the perspectives of law, religion, philosophy, and medicine, respectively Professor Robertson then responds to their
critiques of his approach.

